# What Does Model Layer AI Runtime Security Enforce?

URL: https://airuntimesecuritytools.com/enforcement-point-map/model-layer/
Updated: 2026-11-16

Model-layer enforcement checks the prompts sent to a model and the replies returned, and can block either. On 16 Nov 2026, 12 of 16 tools documented enforcing here specifically, 3 in general terms or in part, and 1 had none found. It is deployed by SDK, proxy or API integration.

## Model layer: every vendor

**Model layer by vendor**

| Vendor | Level | Note | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| [Aim Security](/vendors/aim-security/) | Yes | Prompts and responses inspected inline. | [aim-security-59](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-59), [aim-security-63](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-63) |
| [Check Point](/vendors/check-point/) | Yes | Prompts and outputs screened through the Guard API. | [check-point-42](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-42), [check-point-45](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-45) |
| [Cisco](/vendors/cisco/) | Yes | Prompts and responses inspected. | [cisco-02](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-02), [cisco-03](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-03), [cisco-50](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-50) |
| [Cloudflare](/vendors/cloudflare/) | Yes | Guardrails and DLP inspect prompts and responses. | [cloudflare-05](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-05), [cloudflare-06](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-06) |
| [CrowdStrike](/vendors/crowdstrike/) | Yes | Prompts and responses inspected via gateway and AI interaction protections. | [crowdstrike-14](/vendors/crowdstrike/#fact-crowdstrike-14), [crowdstrike-18](/vendors/crowdstrike/#fact-crowdstrike-18) |
| [HiddenLayer](/vendors/hiddenlayer/) | Yes | Prompts and outputs are inspected by container and evaluation API. | [hiddenlayer-05](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-05), [hiddenlayer-14](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-14), [hiddenlayer-18](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-18) |
| [Lasso Security](/vendors/lasso-security/) | Yes | Inspects prompts and responses at the gateway. | [lasso-security-15](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-15), [lasso-security-14](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-14) |
| [Microsoft](/vendors/microsoft/) | Yes | Prompt Shields and guardrails at the model. | [microsoft-41](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-41), [microsoft-45](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-45) |
| [Palo Alto Networks](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/) | Yes | Prompt and response scanning documented. | [palo-alto-networks-56](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-56), [palo-alto-networks-57](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-57), [palo-alto-networks-59](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-59) |
| [Pillar Security](/vendors/pillar-security/) | Yes | Prompts and responses guarded. | [pillar-security-25](/vendors/pillar-security/#fact-pillar-security-25), [pillar-security-26](/vendors/pillar-security/#fact-pillar-security-26) |
| [SentinelOne (Prompt Security)](/vendors/sentinelone/) | Yes | Real-time AI firewall on prompts and outputs. | [sentinelone-41](/vendors/sentinelone/#fact-sentinelone-41) |
| [Straiker](/vendors/straiker/) | Yes | Inputs and outputs are monitored. | [straiker-40](/vendors/straiker/#fact-straiker-40), [straiker-22](/vendors/straiker/#fact-straiker-22) |
| [Bay](/vendors/bay/) | Partial | Browser prompt guardrails; model output filtering is not the stated focus. | [bay-52](/vendors/bay/#fact-bay-52), [bay-23](/vendors/bay/#fact-bay-23) |
| [Noma Security](/vendors/noma-security/) | Partial | Prompts and responses observed; red teaming pre-release. | [noma-security-31](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-31), [noma-security-40](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-40) |
| [Operant AI](/vendors/operant-ai/) | Partial | AI Gatekeeper inspects LLM requests; inline redaction of sensitive data. | [operant-ai-22](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-22), [operant-ai-28](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-28) |
| [Zenity](/vendors/zenity/) | None found | No prompt and output filtering layer documented; focus is agent actions. | [zenity-57](/vendors/zenity/#fact-zenity-57) |

## What does an enforcement point at the model layer see?

A model-layer control sits on the path between a caller and a language model. It sees the full prompt, any retrieved text that was added to it, and the model's reply. That is enough to detect injected instructions, jailbreak attempts, personal data in a prompt, and harmful or leaking output.

Lasso describes its LEAP guardrail as returning a verdict in under five milliseconds on ordinary CPUs, per Lasso's own benchmarks as reported by SiliconANGLE on 2 Sep 2026, which shows how vendors compete on the cost of this inline check.

## What does it miss?

The model layer cannot see what the agent does after the reply: the shell command, file write or network call. Cisco's Project Quarry post argues that agent attacks unfold across many ordinary, permitted steps that classifiers inspecting standalone prompts and replies do not connect.

The checks themselves can be evaded. A September 2026 arXiv case study of Prompt Guard 2 and an October 2026 paper on multi-scanner guardrails both report bypasses of classifier-based filters in test settings.

Sources: [SiliconANGLE: Lasso Security launches CPU-only AI guardrail](https://siliconangle.com/2026/09/02/lasso-security-launches-cpu-only-ai-guardrail-raises-30m/); [Cisco: Introducing Project Quarry](https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/project-quarry-agent-security-detections).

## How is model-layer enforcement deployed?

Four routes appear in vendor evidence: an SDK called by the application before and after each model call, a reverse proxy or AI gateway in front of the model API, an API integration where the platform calls the vendor for a verdict, and a cloud provider's built-in guardrail on its own model service.

Each route sets different latency, coverage and failure behavior. Whether a control fails open or closed when the vendor is unreachable is a separate question the ranking scores on its own.

## Which tools document it, read 16 Nov 2026

On 16 Nov 2026, 12 of 16 tools had enforcement at the model layer documented specifically, 3 in general terms or partly, and 1 none found. Levels follow the method page: a tool earns yes only when a vendor page or document describes this specifically, and the cell notes quote what the evidence says.

- Documented specifically: Aim Security, Check Point, Cisco, Cloudflare, CrowdStrike, HiddenLayer, Lasso Security, Microsoft, Palo Alto Networks, Pillar Security, SentinelOne (Prompt Security) and Straiker.
- Documented in general terms or in part: Bay, Noma Security and Operant AI.
- None found on 16 Nov 2026: Zenity.

Sources: [Aim Security evidence page for this cell](https://www.catonetworks.com/platform/ai-security-for-applications/); [Check Point evidence page for this cell](https://www.checkpoint.com/ai-security/); [Cisco evidence page for this cell](https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/ai-defense/index.html).

## Related pages

- [The full Enforcement Point Map](/enforcement-point-map/)
- [Endpoint layer](/enforcement-point-map/endpoint-layer/)
- [Application layer](/enforcement-point-map/application-layer/)
- [Method](/enforcement-point-map/methodology/)
- [Vendor profiles](/vendors/)
