# Which AI Runtime Security Tools Block Harmful Output?

URL: https://airuntimesecuritytools.com/runtime-action-type-matrix/harmful-output/
Updated: 2026-11-16

Blocking harmful output means stopping a model reply that is unsafe, ungrounded or leaking data before a user or a downstream tool receives it. As of 16 Nov 2026, 9 of 16 tools documented this specifically, 7 in general terms or in part, and 0 had none found.

## Harmful output: every vendor

**Harmful output by vendor**

| Vendor | Level | Note | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| [Aim Security](/vendors/aim-security/) | Yes | Unsafe outputs are stopped before reaching users or external models. | [aim-security-61](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-61), [aim-security-59](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-59) |
| [Check Point](/vendors/check-point/) | Yes | Content Moderation and Data Leakage Prevention screen model outputs. | [check-point-42](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-42), [check-point-43](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-43) |
| [Cisco](/vendors/cisco/) | Yes | Blocks harmful responses and data leakage in tool responses. | [cisco-02](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-02), [cisco-51](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-51) |
| [Cloudflare](/vendors/cloudflare/) | Yes | Guardrails and DLP can block hazardous or leaking responses. | [cloudflare-06](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-06), [cloudflare-08](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-08) |
| [HiddenLayer](/vendors/hiddenlayer/) | Yes | Detects and redacts or blocks PII, PHI and proprietary data in generated content. | [hiddenlayer-09](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-09), [hiddenlayer-14](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-14) |
| [Lasso Security](/vendors/lasso-security/) | Yes | Inspects responses before they return and can block or mask. | [lasso-security-14](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-14), [lasso-security-15](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-15) |
| [Palo Alto Networks](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/) | Yes | Insecure output, malicious URLs, toxic content and sensitive data leaks in responses are detected and can be blocked. | [palo-alto-networks-56](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-56), [palo-alto-networks-57](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-57), [palo-alto-networks-58](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-58) |
| [SentinelOne (Prompt Security)](/vendors/sentinelone/) | Yes | Scrubs sensitive outputs and monitors LLM responses. | [sentinelone-41](/vendors/sentinelone/#fact-sentinelone-41) |
| [Straiker](/vendors/straiker/) | Yes | Toxic outputs and harmful content generation are blocked. | [straiker-40](/vendors/straiker/#fact-straiker-40) |
| [Bay](/vendors/bay/) | Partial | Bay says it focuses on actions rather than filtering model responses. | [bay-52](/vendors/bay/#fact-bay-52) |
| [CrowdStrike](/vendors/crowdstrike/) | Partial | Gateway inspects responses for risks such as sensitive data leakage. | [crowdstrike-18](/vendors/crowdstrike/#fact-crowdstrike-18) |
| [Microsoft](/vendors/microsoft/) | Partial | Prompt Shields scan inputs and tool responses; harmful output blocking via Foundry guardrails. | [microsoft-43](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-43), [microsoft-45](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-45) |
| [Noma Security](/vendors/noma-security/) | Partial | Sensitive data leakage detected and masked. | [noma-security-22](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-22), [noma-security-20](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-20) |
| [Operant AI](/vendors/operant-ai/) | Partial | Request inspection and redaction documented; output blocking is described generally. | [operant-ai-22](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-22), [operant-ai-37](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-37) |
| [Pillar Security](/vendors/pillar-security/) | Partial | Masks or blocks sensitive data in responses. | [pillar-security-26](/vendors/pillar-security/#fact-pillar-security-26) |
| [Zenity](/vendors/zenity/) | Partial | Sensitive data leakage blocked; harmful model output as such none found. | [zenity-53](/vendors/zenity/#fact-zenity-53), [zenity-57](/vendors/zenity/#fact-zenity-57) |

## What is harmful model output as an AI action?

Harmful output is a model reply that causes damage when used: personal data or secrets in the text, unsafe instructions, or an ungrounded answer presented as fact. In agent systems the reply may also feed another tool.

Cloud platforms build some of these checks in. Amazon Bedrock's document history records that on 19 Oct 2026 Guardrails contextual grounding checks gained a Standard tier that handles responses with reasoning or conversational content.

## Why stop harmful output before it is used?

Once a reply is shown, sent to a customer or passed to a tool, the damage depends on what happens next and cannot be recalled. An output filter is the last control that sees the text before that point.

Filters trade accuracy against latency and cost, and each tool sets its own action on a hit: block, redact, mask or log.

Sources: [Amazon Bedrock User Guide document history](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/doc-history.html).

## Where in the stack can harmful output be stopped?

Output checks sit at the model layer (a guardrail on the model call), the application layer (an API integration, SDK or reverse proxy in front of an AI app) and, for agents, the agent layer where a reply is inspected before it triggers a tool.

An endpoint control does not read the reply itself; it can stop the action that follows.

## Which tools document it, read 16 Nov 2026

On 16 Nov 2026, 9 of 16 tools had harmful or leaking model output blocked documented specifically, 7 in general terms or partly, and 0 none found. Levels follow the method page: a tool earns yes only when a vendor page or document describes this specifically, and the cell notes quote what the evidence says.

- Documented specifically: Aim Security, Check Point, Cisco, Cloudflare, HiddenLayer, Lasso Security, Palo Alto Networks, SentinelOne (Prompt Security) and Straiker.
- Documented in general terms or in part: Bay, CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Noma Security, Operant AI, Pillar Security and Zenity.

Sources: [Aim Security evidence page for this cell](https://www.catonetworks.com/platform/ai-security-for-applications/); [Check Point evidence page for this cell](https://www.checkpoint.com/ai-security/); [Cisco evidence page for this cell](https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/ai-defense/index.html).

## Related pages

- [The full Runtime Action Type Matrix](/runtime-action-type-matrix/)
- [Prompt injection](/runtime-action-type-matrix/prompt-injection/)
- [Method](/runtime-action-type-matrix/methodology/)
- [Vendor profiles](/vendors/)
