# Which AI Runtime Security Tools Block Prompt Injection?

URL: https://airuntimesecuritytools.com/runtime-action-type-matrix/prompt-injection/
Updated: 2026-11-16

Blocking prompt injection means stopping instructions hidden in input, a page or a tool result from steering an AI model or agent. On 16 Nov 2026, 16 of 16 tools documented this specifically, 0 in general terms or in part, and 0 had none found.

## Prompt injection: every vendor

**Prompt injection by vendor**

| Vendor | Level | Note | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| [Aim Security](/vendors/aim-security/) | Yes | Prompt injection and jailbreaks are detected and blocked inline. | [aim-security-59](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-59), [aim-security-60](/vendors/aim-security/#fact-aim-security-60) |
| [Bay](/vendors/bay/) | Yes | Vendor says it prevents prompt injection attempts at runtime. | [bay-51](/vendors/bay/#fact-bay-51) |
| [Check Point](/vendors/check-point/) | Yes | Prompt Defense blocks prompt injection and jailbreaks at runtime. | [check-point-42](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-42), [check-point-43](/vendors/check-point/#fact-check-point-43) |
| [Cisco](/vendors/cisco/) | Yes | Page lists prompt injection protection. | [cisco-03](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-03), [cisco-02](/vendors/cisco/#fact-cisco-02) |
| [Cloudflare](/vendors/cloudflare/) | Yes | Injection score from 1 to 99 with a Block action in WAF rules. | [cloudflare-01](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-01), [cloudflare-02](/vendors/cloudflare/#fact-cloudflare-02) |
| [CrowdStrike](/vendors/crowdstrike/) | Yes | Detects and protects supported AI interactions against prompt injection using SafeMind. | [crowdstrike-13](/vendors/crowdstrike/#fact-crowdstrike-13), [crowdstrike-14](/vendors/crowdstrike/#fact-crowdstrike-14) |
| [HiddenLayer](/vendors/hiddenlayer/) | Yes | Blocks indirect and direct prompt injection before agent execution. | [hiddenlayer-07](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-07), [hiddenlayer-14](/vendors/hiddenlayer/#fact-hiddenlayer-14) |
| [Lasso Security](/vendors/lasso-security/) | Yes | Blocks injected inputs and MCP tool poisoning. | [lasso-security-18](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-18), [lasso-security-21](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-21), [lasso-security-53](/vendors/lasso-security/#fact-lasso-security-53) |
| [Microsoft](/vendors/microsoft/) | Yes | Runtime protection and Prompt Shields block prompt injection. | [microsoft-19](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-19), [microsoft-41](/vendors/microsoft/#fact-microsoft-41) |
| [Noma Security](/vendors/noma-security/) | Yes | Detects prompt injection with block policy. | [noma-security-22](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-22), [noma-security-53](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-53), [noma-security-20](/vendors/noma-security/#fact-noma-security-20) |
| [Operant AI](/vendors/operant-ai/) | Yes | Blocks prompt-injected commands and injected agent behavior. | [operant-ai-23](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-23), [operant-ai-27](/vendors/operant-ai/#fact-operant-ai-27) |
| [Palo Alto Networks](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/) | Yes | Block actions stop prompts flagged as injection in API Intercept, Network Intercept and gateway. | [palo-alto-networks-47](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-47), [palo-alto-networks-57](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-57), [palo-alto-networks-59](/vendors/palo-alto-networks/#fact-palo-alto-networks-59) |
| [Pillar Security](/vendors/pillar-security/) | Yes | Detects and blocks prompt injection. | [pillar-security-25](/vendors/pillar-security/#fact-pillar-security-25) |
| [SentinelOne (Prompt Security)](/vendors/sentinelone/) | Yes | AI firewall blocks adversarial prompts and prompt injections. | [sentinelone-41](/vendors/sentinelone/#fact-sentinelone-41), [sentinelone-46](/vendors/sentinelone/#fact-sentinelone-46) |
| [Straiker](/vendors/straiker/) | Yes | Direct and indirect prompt injection are blocked. | [straiker-22](/vendors/straiker/#fact-straiker-22), [straiker-40](/vendors/straiker/#fact-straiker-40) |
| [Zenity](/vendors/zenity/) | Yes | AIDR blocks direct and indirect prompt injection before the agent acts. | [zenity-52](/vendors/zenity/#fact-zenity-52) |

## What is prompt injection as an AI action?

Prompt injection is text that a model reads as an instruction when it was meant as data: in a user message, a web page, a repository file or the result of a tool. Prompt Security groups repository instructions, retrieved pages and installed skills as sources that can shape what a model intends to do.

Intent alone rarely does the damage; what turns it into harm is the tools, credentials and approval policy behind the agent.

## Why stop it before the action completes?

Classifiers that flag injected text can be evaded. A September 2026 arXiv study of Prompt Guard 2 found that guided synonym substitution and paraphrasing could flip its predictions, and an October 2026 paper reports a bypass method succeeding against six multi-scanner guardrails in its tests.

These results argue for layered control: detect the injection and also gate the action it asks for, so a missed detection does not become a completed harm.

Sources: [arXiv 2609.24801: Decoding Guardrails](https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24801); [arXiv 2610.10742: BRANCH, bypassing multi-scanner AI guardrails](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10742).

## Where in the stack can it be stopped?

Input filtering sits at the model and application layers, between the user or retrieved content and the model. The agent layer adds inspection of tool results and a decision before each tool call. The endpoint layer is the backstop that can stop the resulting action on the machine.

Detection quality varies with the layer and the content type, so the cells record only what each vendor documents.

## Which tools document it, read 16 Nov 2026

On 16 Nov 2026, 16 of 16 tools had prompt injection blocked documented specifically, 0 in general terms or partly, and 0 none found. Levels follow the method page: a tool earns yes only when a vendor page or document describes this specifically, and the cell notes quote what the evidence says.

- Documented specifically: Aim Security, Bay, Check Point, Cisco, Cloudflare, CrowdStrike, HiddenLayer, Lasso Security, Microsoft, Noma Security, Operant AI, Palo Alto Networks, Pillar Security, SentinelOne (Prompt Security), Straiker and Zenity.

Sources: [Aim Security evidence page for this cell](https://www.catonetworks.com/platform/ai-security-for-applications/); [Bay evidence page for this cell](https://www.bay.io/platform?utm_source=airuntimesecuritytools.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=asset-dim); [Check Point evidence page for this cell](https://www.checkpoint.com/ai-security/).

## Related pages

- [The full Runtime Action Type Matrix](/runtime-action-type-matrix/)
- [Harmful output](/runtime-action-type-matrix/harmful-output/)
- [Method](/runtime-action-type-matrix/methodology/)
- [Vendor profiles](/vendors/)
